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In sports betting markets, bets on favorites tend to have a higher expected value than bets on 
longshots. This article uses a data set of almost 45,000 professional single tennis matches to show 
that the favorite-longshot bias is much stronger in matches between lower-ranked players, in later-
round matches, and in high-profile tournaments. These results cannot be solely explained by bettors 
being locally risk-loving or overestimating chances of longshots, but are consistent with 
bookmakers protecting themselves against both better informed insiders and the general public 
exploiting new information. 
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1 Introduction 
In sports betting markets, bets on favorites usually have a higher expected value than bets on 
longshots (Sauer, 1998; Cain et al., 2003). There are three types of explanations for this so-called 
favorite-longshot bias (Snowberg and Wolfers, 2010; Makropoulou and Markellos, 2011). The first 
explanation claims that bettors are local risk-lovers and bookmakers take advantage by lowering 
the odds on longshots. According to the second explanation, bettors overestimate winning 
probabilities of longshots and bookmakers again take advantage of this psychological bias. The third 
explanation is based on information asymmetry; bookmakers could potentially lose a lot of money if 
they underestimate longshots and this mispricing is exploited by either better informed insiders or 
by the general public reacting faster than bookmakers to new information. Therefore, bookmakers 
offer lower odds on longshots to protect themselves against this type of loss. 
To distinguish between these competing explanations, this article uses a data set of almost 45,000 
professional single tennis matches to show that the favorite-longshot bias is much more 
pronounced in matches between lower-ranked players, in later-round matches, and in high-profile 
tournaments. These results, as discussed later, are consistent with the information asymmetry 
explanation. The favorite-longshot bias in tennis was already analyzed by Forrest and McHale 
(2007), but they had a much smaller data set, did not test the effect of players’ ranks or tournament 
round, and did not find any difference for high-profile tournaments. 
2 Data 
The data set consists of results of 44,871 professional men’s and women’s single tennis matches 
with valid betting odds.1 The decimal betting odds on each player’s win were converted to implied 
probabilities of winning in the standard way by calculating their inverse values. Since the two 
resulting numbers for each match add up to more than one to allow the bookmaker to have profit, 
they have to be both divided by their sum. Because the two possible bets on each match are not 
independent (implied probabilities add up to one, exactly one bet pays off), only one (chosen 
randomly) is included in the final data set. Therefore, there are 44,871 observed bets with an 
implied probability of the player winning (variable ImpliedProbability) and a corresponding match 
result (variable Result that equals one if the player won and zero if the player lost). 
To test how the favorite-longshot bias differs across various types of matches, the following dummy 
variables are defined: LowerRank equals one in 12,878 matches where both players were outside of 
                                                             
1 The data set was downloaded from the website tennis-data.co.uk on June 22nd, 2013. The men’s tennis 
matches start in 2002; the women’s matches start in 2007. The betting odds are the latest available odds by 
the bookmaker Bet365. Originally, there were 48,042 matches, but 3,171 matches (6.6%) were discarded due 
to missing odds or a withdrawal of one player before the match started. 
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top 50 in ATP/WTA rankings, zero otherwise; LaterRound equals one in 24,189 matches that were 
not in the first round (lowest round in the data set), zero otherwise; and HighProfile equals one in 
8,962 matches in a high-profile tournament (Grand Slam, ATP World Tour Finals, or WTA Tour 
Championships), zero otherwise. 
3 Model and Results 
To test whether the favorite-longshot bias exists in the market as a whole, the following standard 
linear probability model is employed: 
Result = β0 + β1 * ImpliedProbability + ε 
In the absence of bias (null hypothesis), the coefficient values would be β0 = 0 and β1 = 1, while the 
standard favorite-longshot bias would be indicated by β0 < 0 and β1 > 1. The estimation results2 in 
Table 1 show that the favorite-longshot bias is indeed present in the investigated data set; the 
winning probability implied by the betting odds is lower than the actual probability in case of 
longshots and higher than the actual probability in case of favorites. 
 Coefficient Standard Error 
Constant -0.0293*** 0.0044 
ImpliedProbability 1.0594*** 0.0077 
Table 1: The Favorite-Longshot Bias in the Whole Market, N = 44,871 
To investigate whether the favorite-longshot bias differs across various types of matches, the model 
is expanded in the following way: 
 Result = β0 + β1 * ImpliedProbability + β2 * LowerRank + β3 * LowerRank * ImpliedProbability + β4 * 
LaterRound + β5 * LaterRound * ImpliedProbability + β6 * HighProfile + β7 * HighProfile * 
ImpliedProbability + ε 
In case of no difference among various types of matches (the null hypothesis), β2 … β7 = 0, while the 
overall bias would still be captured by β0 < 0 and β1 > 1. The estimation results for the expanded 
model are presented in Table 2. 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
2 The estimation method in the whole article is OLS with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. One star 
indicates p-value < 0.1, two stars p-value < 0.05, three stars p-value < 0.01. 
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 Coefficient Standard Error 
Constant 0.0032 0.0085 
ImpliedProbability 1.0051 0.0148 
LowerRank -0.0539*** 0.0132 
LowerRank * ImpliedProbability  0.0918*** 0.0244 
LaterRound -0.0233** 0.0092 
LaterRound * ImpliedProbability 0.0358** 0.0162 
HighProfile -0.0361*** 0.0094 
HighProfile * ImpliedProbability 0.0704*** 0.0160 
Table 2: The Favorite-Longshot Bias across Various Types of Matches, N = 44,871  
The coefficients show the favorite-longshot bias is much stronger in matches between lower-ranked 
players, in later-round matches, and in matches in high-profile tournaments, while it is practically 
nonexistent in the other matches. These results are robust across different model specifications and 
have also been confirmed by comparing average implied probabilities with relative frequencies of 
winning over different probability ranges for different types of matches (similarly to Forrest and 
McHale 2007). A graphical analysis also confirms that the relationship between the implied and 
actual probability of a win is approximately linear. 
4 Discussion 
The results seem to be contradictory; on the one hand, the favorite-longshot bias is stronger in 
later-round matches and in matches in high-profile tournaments, i.e. in matches that are likely to 
attract high betting volumes; on the other hand, the favorite-longshot bias is also more pronounced 
in matches between lower-ranked players, which are likely to exhibit low betting volumes. This 
pattern cannot be explained solely by people being local risk-lovers or overestimating chances of 
longshots; if all bettors had the same preferences or biases, the type of match should not matter at 
all. Even if the risk-loving preferences (or the corresponding bias) were exhibited only by occasional 
bettors, thus causing the stronger favorite-longshot bias in matches that are likely to attract high 
betting volumes, it would not explain why the bias is also more pronounced in matches between 
lower-ranked players. Therefore, at last one part of the explanation must lie in the information 
asymmetry. 
Forrest and McHale (2007) argued that in Grand Slam tournaments, players are more motivated and 
less likely to underperform, so the role of private information should be much smaller. 
Consequently, if the favorite-longshot bias was a defense of bookmakers against better informed 
insiders, it should be smaller in high-profile tournaments. However, according to the results in this 
article, the bias is actually larger. This is hard to explain as a defense against insider trading; besides 
players being more motivated, the proportion of insiders among all bettors is also likely to be 
smaller, not larger, in high-profile tournaments. 
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The most plausible explanation of the results seems to be a combination of two information 
asymmetry approaches: Matches between lower-ranked players are harder to predict, since public 
information is limited and private information about players’ motivation or health problems could 
play a large role; therefore, it makes sense for the bookmaker to set lower odds on the longshot to 
minimize possible losses. On the other hand, private information should not play such a big role in 
later tournament rounds and high-profile tournaments, but in such matches the bookmaker faces a 
different kind of risk; the general public could react faster than the bookmaker to newly available 
information. Combined with a high volume of bets, this could mean a considerable loss, so the 
bookmaker again protects itself by setting lower odds on the longshot.  
Of course, the information asymmetry explanation does not rule out that the other alternatives, i.e. 
risk-loving preferences or overestimating small probabilities of winning, also play a role. Clearly, 
more research is needed. One possible direction would be to test more thoroughly whether the 
stronger favorite-longshot bias in high-profile tournaments also exists in other individual or team 
sports (or even in tennis doubles); if the above explanation is correct, the effect in team sports 
should be smaller, since the impact of new information (e.g. a minor sickness of a player) is likely to 
have less influence on the expected result. 
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